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OPDU Report 24
- May 2008
Trustee Risk Management
Pension Scheme Design: where now?
PART2: Towards a new beginning?
Hamish Wilson
With defined benefit pension provision reducing, particularly in the
private sector, the debate on whether there are viable options to
the main alternative method of defined contribution, which passes
all the risks to the member, is gathering pace.
The following two articles bring out some of the issues associated
with this but from different perspectives. The first, from Guus
Boender and Lucas Vermeulen of Ortec, draws on experience from
Europe and how this might have application to the provision of
retirement benefits in the UK. The second, from Hamish Wilson,
builds on these themes, making reference to the mandatory
requirements that were progressively introduced for defined benefit
schemes and which may have inadvertently contributed to their
decline.
Although some proposals were not included within the recent Pensions
Bill, the issue of shared risk arrangements is likely to feature
more prominently as the industry looks to find solutions that
address some of the challenges of defined benefit and defined
contribution pension schemes.
These two articles are intended to stimulate the debate in this
area.
To begin at the beginning
Once upon a time well-meaning employers concluded it would be a good
idea to provide pensions to former staff. Typically pensions were a
fraction of the member’s salary (often dependent on the length of
service).
The final salary pension scheme was born. The employer had the satis-faction
of providing an element of financial support in retirement. The
pension supported the business too, enabling it to attract and
retain staff in the good times but also making the break less
painful particularly in hard times.
What happened next?
Over time, a whole new industry developed to support this provision
of pension. A new structure arose with trustees given significant
powers over the schemes which arose to deliver pensions. The well
meaning employers had begun to lose control.
A large raft of advisers and service providers arrived on the scene.
They explained that reluctantly, they had to charge the market rate.
The market rate was not cheap.
The Government became interested, imposing taxation and more
seriously making employers ‘guarantee’ pension benefits that had
previously been discretionary i.e. in effect dependent on employers
changing fortunes which of course are not guaranteed.
In the beginning there was no obligation to provide increases in
either payment or deferment and usually no obligation to provide any
pension to members who left service well before retirement.
Government introduced various requirements to reduce discrimin-ation
between various classes of members (specifically pensioners,
deferred pensioners and active members). That was a noble aim. But
it couldn’t stop at legislating through principle (allowing
employers to find a sustainable solution). It thought it knew best
and instead forced employers who had voluntarily introduced pensions
to:
- l provide pensions to members with five years’ service (shortened
subsequently to two years and now
three months)
- increase pensions between the date of leaving and retirement
date in line with inflation (subject
to a ceiling of 5%pa) Worse still, it
made this requirement retrospective in some circumstances
- increase pensions in payment in line with inflation (subject to a
ceiling of 5%pa).
These three improvements, taken alone have probably acted to double
the cost of pension provision.
In addition to the above further legislation introduced to avoid
discrimination on grounds of sex and age has tended to impose
additional costs with actual or perceived obligations to level up to
the better benefits in either case.
In each of the three years from 2000 to 2002 the equity market fell.
As 2000 neared its end investment consultants reassured us that
these things do not happen two years running. Yet now we find
ourselves in 2008 with the FTSE equity index (admittedly ignoring
dividends) still well below its end 1999 level. Past returns and
historically low ‘risk-free’ investment returns mean that schemes
are in deficit and provision continues to be expensive.
And finally there is increasing longevity. It is a measure of how
punch drunk the industry has become that this is perceived as almost
entirely a bad thing (with industry figures delivering an
unconvincing throw-away line that it might be good for ‘people in
general’ but….).
Those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it
The preceding catalogue (and readers will have their own additions)
is included because we must learn from the past (as well as for
masochistic purposes!).
Many of the improvements (in particular those that eliminate
discrimination) are right and proper. However it is the levelling up
associated with them that is unsustainable.
I believe there is now a greater acceptance that uncertainty is part
of our lives. In the pensions arena this arises primarily from
investment returns and longevity.
In a climate of uncertainty it is not realistic to keep imposing
additional burdens without the system breaking at some point. The
existence of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) is a direct
acknowledgement of this point.
The employers exposed to these additional costs now find their
businesses are under threat in the illusory pursuit of a
‘guaranteed’ high quality benefit. Interestingly, the PPF has
provisions which allow it to reduce its compensation in certain
circumstances. Yet the Government denies similar flexibility to
those well meaning employers wishing to provide good quality
benefits.
Money purchase benefits
The knee-jerk reaction to the evils of the past has been the
introduction of money purchase or defined contribution pension
provision. The advantage of this approach (from the employer’s
perspective) is that the cost of benefit provision becomes fixed
giving rise to the additional benefit of simple accounting.
From the member’s perspective it is a less than satisfactory
solution. Put simply all the uncertainty over the cost of benefit
provision is transferred from the employer to the individual.
In the new spirit of individuals taking control of their own
destinies DC members are expected to assess the adequacy of personal
funding plans and make complex investment decisions, often with
little more than the spurious comfort that their money is being
invested in a default ‘cautiously invested’ fund.
A minority of members can cope with this (or have sufficiently thick
skin or wallet to weather the storm if it goes wrong). The vast
majority are ill equipped to do so or lack the will to do so (there
are many more pleasurable ways to spend time).
A number have already suffered as a result of retiring at the wrong
time; hit by the ‘triple whammy’ of low equity markets and low
interest rates coupled with emerging awareness of increasing
longevity and its adverse effect on annuity rates.
The relative immaturity of DC provision coupled with the greater
lobbying power of ‘corporate UK’ as opposed to ‘employee UK’ mean
that adverse publicity from inadequate DC provision has yet to hit
the headlines to the same extent as DB provision. But it will…
Shared risk arrangements
In the circumstances it seems extraordinary that no middle ground
has been found between DB and DC. The failure of the recent Pensions
Bill even to pave the way is particularly disappointing, but perhaps
not surprising – what incentive do politicians have to address the
problem?
One can only speculate that removal of the excellent civil service
(and the even more generous MPs’) final salary pensions, with full
indexation and underwritten by taxation, might be needed before the
required understanding of pensions is achieved. Certainly the high
turnover of pensions ministers does not suggest the issue is
regarded as important.
From any perspective this seems short-sighted. With an increasingly
ageing population, the Government should welcome anything that
increases pensioner prosperity so harnessing the ‘grey haired’ vote
and minimising potential problems from means testing in the future.
The pensions industry itself has been subdued (albeit with several
honour-able exceptions). This is perhaps surprising as the people
within it may be amongst the biggest losers from the current demise
of DB pension provision. Perhaps the older members of the industry,
whilst regretting the current DB wasteland, no longer have the
energy for the fight and take too much comfort from the thought that
the current state of affairs will nevertheless ‘see them through’.
And perhaps the younger ones have forgotten how to think at all.
But of course this is primarily about employers and their employees.
The current state of affairs perpetuates the position where all the
risk falls on either the former (DB) or for the latter (DC). It
seems a universally accepted truth that a healthy relationship
should involve some ‘give and take’ yet the UK pension regime does
not allow this.
A solution (the Association of Consulting Actuaries model)
It is probably worth starting with the solution proposed by the
Association of Consulting Actuaries (whose President Ian Farr has
been a vocal champion of the ‘middle way’). Their proposal involves;
l a career average salary pension (this avoids the unfairness of
differ ential revaluation rates implicit in
final salary pensions)
- an expectation that each year’s
pension should increase in deferment and payment in line with
inflation (subject to a cap such as
2.5%pa) (it is important that these
are the same to avoid discrimination between different classes of
member)
- ability for the employer to with
hold these increases if the scheme’s
assets were insufficient to cover the
past service benefits (protection for
the employer in adverse conditions)
- retention of the current scheme
specific funding regime meaning
that employers would fund for
future increases (and so helping
ensure funds exist to support benefits)
- the ability to wind up the scheme
without paying full future increases
in deferment and payment (so that
employers are not ruined if unable
to meet them)
- other safeguards (eg the ability to
reduce future accrual or to increase
retirement age if longevity increased).
This approach is essentially closer to the defined benefit model but
with the proviso that increases are conditional upon affordability.
It might be the natural starting point for employers currently
struggling with DB provision but nervous about exposing employees to
the full brunt of DC. The ACA reckons some 900,000 private sector
employees continue to accrue DB benefits.
Another solution (the HamishWilson model)
An alternative approach which we have promoted is modelled more
closely on the defined contribution regime and involves:
- a known employer contribution
commitment just like DC schemes
(so fixed with discretion to change
giving employers the ability to
control costs)
- an underlying defined benefit
target (not guaranteed – but
chosen to be easily affordable at
the chosen level of employer
contribution and so reasonably
robust. This provides members
with a high degree of certainty
over the level of benefit) comprising
- a career average pension (as in
the ACA proposal)
- an intention (so not guaranteed) to provide increases in
deferment and in payment (it is
essential these are the same to
avoid discriminating between
different classes of members)
- the ability to wind up at any
stage without employer debt (so
that the arrangement does not
ultimately bring the sponsoring
employer to its knees)
- management of the scheme to be
delegated to trustees (including
crucially the extent of increases
in deferment and payment).
With the underpin of the known employer contribution, this sort of
scenario is a more natural harbour for those who have already moved
in that direction (the majority of the private sector) but would
welcome the opportunity to improve risk sharing between members –
both within and between different cohorts.
Alternatives
It would be possible to come up with various alternatives (and
tempting to offer the ritual bottle of champagne for the best
suggestion).
In short, it does not matter which sort of approach is adopted; a
healthy market (supported by principle driven legislation) will
always have a good choice.
The baggage
The main objection to risk sharing is that current legislation will
not permit it. This is a smokescreen from those lacking the will to
consider an alternative.
We do understand and respect the legislation that has built up in
the past and (perhaps reluctantly) accept that it needs to be
retained (but only for benefits accrued to date).
For the future (if indeed the pensions industry is to have one) we
need the vision and courage to shake off the chains of the past. It
can be done!
Conclusion
I have yet to find anyone who objects absolutely to either DB or DC
(the objections, such as they are, sit in a given context). In the
circumstances it seems hard to understand how anyone could object to
a solution that sits between them.
I am forced to conclude that the lack of progress reflects an
inability of MPs and legislators to engage with a problem which sits
outside their own comfortable experience.
The sad fact is that if action for risk sharing schemes is not taken
quickly, the opportunity will be lost. It will be the next
generation that are the losers and it will be our job to explain why
we let them down.
Hamish Wilson
Partner, HamishWilson
01737 841730
hamish.wilson@hamishwilson.com
www.hamishwilson.com
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